Humans were thought to be unique among the species in having minds, but recent results showing the richness and diversity in animal psychology makes this view untenable. Yet there remains the question of whether we can map the features of a particularly human psychology that are responsible for its overall structure. In this book John Campbell shows that the general structural features of human thought can be seen as having their source in the distinctive ways in which we think about space and time. He describes the contrasts between animal representations of space and time and distinctively human ways of thinking about them. In particular, he shows what is special about the human ability of to think about the past. Campbell looks at how self-consciousness exploits these particular abilities in thinking about space and the past. He discusses at length the relation between self-consciousness and the first person and how fundamental the first person is in ordinary thought. Campbell shows that the structured character of ordinary thinking can be explained by reference to the demands of first-person thinking and the way in which first-person thiinking exploits distinctively human respresentations of space and time. Finally, he considers the metaphysical implications of this approach, in particular, how ordinary self-consciousness relies on a realist view of the past.

Introduction Frames of Reference 1.1 The Distinction 1.2 Egocentric Frames 1.3 Maps 1.4 Physical Objects and Objective Space 1.5 Common Causes and Informative Identities The Past 2.1 Temporal Orientation 2.2 Primitive Physics: Causal Indexicality and Working 2.3 Timing Systems 2.4 An Explicit Physics 2.5 Common Causes and the Time Order The First Person 3.1 Trading on Identity 3.2 Keeping Track 3.3 The First Person as a Token-Reflexive Self-Reference and Self-Knowledge 4.1 The Problem 4.2 The Perceptual-Demonstrative Model 4.3 Conceptual Role, Reference, and the Body Image 4.4 Psychological Structure The Reductionist View of the Self 5.1 What Reductionism Is 5.2 Ascribing Experiences 5.3 Causal and Normative Relations 5.4 Fission and Death Conceptual Structure and 6.1 A Repertoire of Concepts 6.2 Truth, Structure, and the Simple Theory 6.3 Realism The Realism of Memory 7.1 The Opposition to Realism 7.2 Truth-Value Links 7.3 The Stepwise Conception of Memory 7.4 Incommensurability 7.5 Immersion

John Campbell is Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at New College, Oxford University.

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