Referentialism has underappreciated consequences for our understanding of the ways in which mind, language, and world relate to one another. In exploring these consequences, this book defends a version of referentialism about names, demonstratives, and indexicals, in a manner appropriate for scholars and students in philosophy or the cognitive sciences. To demonstrate his view, Kenneth A. Taylor offers original and provocative accounts of a wide variety of semantic, pragmatic, and psychological phenomena, such as empty names, propositional attitude contexts, the nature of concepts, and the ultimate source and nature of normativity.

등록된 사용후기

사용후기 쓰기 새 창 더보기

사용후기가 없습니다.

등록된 상품문의

상품문의 쓰기새 창 더보기

상품문의가 없습니다.

배송정보

교환/반품 정보