Amos Tversky (1937--1996), a towering figure in cognitive and mathematical psychology, devoted his professional life to the study of similarity, judgment, and decision making. He had a unique ability to master the technicalities of normative ideals and then to intuit and demonstrate experimentally their systematic violation due to the vagaries and consequences of human information processing. He created new areas of study and helped transform disciplines as varied as economics, law, medicine, political science, philosophy, and statistics.This book collects forty of Tversky's articles, selected by him in collaboration with the editor during the last months of Tversky's life. It is divided into three sections: Similarity, Judgment, and Preferences. The Preferences section is subdivided into Probabilistic Models of Choice, Choice under Risk and Uncertainty, and Contingent Preferences. Included are several articles written with his frequent collaborator, Nobel Prize-winning economist Daniel Kahneman.

1. Features of Similarity
Amos Tversky 7

2. Additive Similarity Trees
Shmuel Sattath and Amos Tversky 47

3. Studies of Similarity
Amos Tversky and Itamar Gati 75

4. Weighting Common and Distinctive Features in Perceptual and Conceptual Judgments
Itamar Gati and Amos Tversky 97

5. Nearest Neighbor Analysis of Psychological Spaces
Amos Tversky and J. Wesley Hutchinson 129

6. On the Relation between Common and Distinctive Feature Models
Shmuel Sattath and Amos Tversky 171

JUDGMENT 187

Editor's Introductory Remarks 189

7. Belief in the Law of Small Numbers
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 193

8. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 203

9. Extensional vs. Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment
Amos Tversky 221

10. The Cold Facts about the "Hot Hand" in Basketball
Amos Tversky and Thomas Gilovich 257

Editor's Introductory Remarks to Chapter 11 267

11. The "Hot Hand": Statistical Reality or Cognitive Illusion?
Amos Tversky and Thomas Gilovich 269

12. The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence
Dale Griffin and Amos Tversky 275

13. On the Evaluation of Probability Judgments: Calibration, Resolution, and Monotonicity
Varda Liberman and Amos Tversky 301

14. Support Theory: A Nonextensional Representation of Subjective Probability
Amos Tversky and Derek J. Koehler 329

15. On the Belief That Arthritis Pain Is Related to the Weather
Donald A. Redelmeier and Amos Tversky 377

16. Unpacking, Repacking, and Anchoring: Advances in Support Theory 383

PREFERENCE 403

Editor's Introductory Remarks 405

17. On the Optimal Number of Alternatives at a Choice Point
Amos Tversky 413

18. Sustitutability and Similarity in Binary Choices
Amos Tversky and J. Edward Russo 419

19. The Intransitivity of Preferences
Amos Tversky 433

20. Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice
Amos Tversky 463

21. Preference Trees
Amos Tversky and Shmuel Sattath 493

Choice under Risk and Uncertainty 547

22. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 549

23. On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies
Barbara J. McNeil, Stephen G. Pauker, Harold C. Sox, Jr. and Amos Tversky 583

24. Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 593

25. Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice
George A. Quattrone and Amos Tversky 621

26. Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice under Uncertainty
Chip Heath and Amos Tversky 645

27. Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 673

28. Thinking through Uncertainty: Nonconsequential Reasoning and Choice
Eldar Shafir and Amos Tversky 703

29. Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 729

30. Weighing Risk and Uncertainty
Amos Tversky and Craig. R. Fox 747

31. Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance
Craig. R. Fox and Amos Tversky 777

32. A Belief-Based Account of Decision under Uncertainty
Craig. R. Fox and Amos Tversky 795

Contingent Preferences 823

33. Self-Deception and the Voter's Illusion
George A. Quattrone and Amos Tversky 825

34. Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice
Amos Tversky, Shmuel Sattath and Paul Slovic 845

35. Anomalies: Preference Reversals
Amos Tversky and Richard H. Thaler 875

36. Discrepancy between Medical Decisions for Individual Patients and for Groups
Donald A. Redelmeier and Amos Tversky 887

37. Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 895

38. Endowment and Contrast in Judgments of Well-Being
Amos Tversky and Dale Griffin 917

39. Reason-Based Choice
Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson and Amos Tversky 937

40. Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making
Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich and Amos Tversky 963

Amos Tversky's Complete Bibliography 995

Index 1001

Eldar Shafir is Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs at Princeton University.

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